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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No- 920558-CA

v.
Priority No. 2

DONALD HYLAND KEITZ,
Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Donald Hyland Keitz appeals his conviction
for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1) (Supp. 1992), entered in the Fifth Judicial District
Court, in and for Iron County, Utah, the Honorable Robert T.
Braithwaite, presiding.

This Court has appellate jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
As will be shown in this brief, this case is in a
peculiar procedural posture, not previously recognized by the
parties or the trial court.

Because of this, the State re-frames

the issues on appeal, as follows:
1.

May defendant preserve his "entrapment- defense for

appellate review, without proceeding to trial, through entry of a
conditional guilty plea?

This is a procedural question regarding

the kinds of situations in which a defendant should be allowed to

enter a conditional guilty plea while reserving pretrial issues
for appellate review; it also involves the interpretation of
Utah's entrapment statute. As such, it is a question of law,
reviewed without deference to the trial court.

See State v.

Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah App. 1988) (permitting
conditional guilty pleas upon denial of motions to suppress
evidence); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991)
(statutory interpretation is a question of law)•
2.

If defendant's entrapment argument is now reviewed,

did the trial court correctly deny his pretrial, entrapment-based
motion to dismiss?

A motion to dismiss under Utah's entrapment

statute is effectively a claim of insufficient evidence to
support guilt; accordingly, a deferential, "clear error" standard
of review applies.
(Utah 1989).

See State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225

Framed as a "due process" challenge to police

conduct, such motion may present a question of law, once the
underlying facts are established, reviewed without deference.
See State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1988).
3.

Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's

motion to suppress marijuana seized incident to his arrest, and
scales seized pursuant to defendant's consent?

For the purposes

of this appeal, and addressing only the marijuana seizure, the
trial court's findings of underlying or preliminary facts can be
deferentially reviewed for "clear error," while its conclusion on
the constitutional permissiblity of the search or seizure,
flowing from those facts, can be reviewed without deference.

See

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991); State v.

Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1990).

As will be shown

in the body of this brief, the seizure of defendant's scales, and
the "voluntary consent" issue associated with that seizure, is,
as a matter of law, a moot question.

See Burkett v. Schwendiman,

773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah's entrapment statute, and the federal and state
"due process" and "search and seizure" constitutional provisions,
are set forth in defendant's Brief of Appellant at 9-10.

Other

constitutional provisions, statutes and rules pertinent to this
appeal will be set forth as needed in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As stated in the Brief of Appellant, defendant was
originally charged with possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, and with possession of drug paraphernalia.
Enhanced penalties were sought because the offenses allegedly
occurred in proximity to a Little League ballpark (R. 36-37 J.1
Defendant's pretrial motions to dismiss the charges,
alleging "entrapment," and his pretrial motion to suppress
marijuana and weighing scales seized from his home, were denied
(R. 147-50).

A plea bargain was then negotiated, and defendant

pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute; the paraphernalia charge and proximity
enhancement were dropped, as was a forfeiture action against
x

The main record is R. 1-214; Transcripts are also numbered
into the record as R. 215-481. All parenthetical record and
transcript references will therefore be designated "R."
3

defendant's van (R. 160). While pleading guilty, defendant
preserved the right to appeal the denial of his pretrial motions
(id.; R. 163).
Defendant received a suspended prison sentence, and was
placed on probation (R. 202-06).

This appeal ensued upon timely

notice (R. 200, 206).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial court did not resolve all the conflicting
testimony pertaining to defendant's pretrial motions that are the
subjects of this appeal (see "Ruling" at R. 147-48, reproduced in
the addendum to Br. of Appellant).

Because those conflicts are

largely between defendant and the police officers who testified
at the motion hearing, this Court could assume that the trial
court resolved them in accord with its denial of the motions.
See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991).

However,

because of the unique posture of this case, the State's fact
recitation, while stressing the evidence supporting the trial
court's decisions, will acknowledge the conflicting evidence,
particularly that regarding defendant's entrapment allegation.
The Undercover Operation
From late 1990 through mid-1991 defendant was friendly
with a cocktail waitress he knew as Annie, who was actually an
undercover police officer named Ann Burchett (R. 219, 434-36).
Burchett's duties entailed befriending any drug users and dealers
in the Brian Head, Utah area (R. 439-41).

4

Toward that end,

Burchett made herself known as a drug user, making drug purchases
and occasionally feigning drug use (R. 441-43).2
As part of her training for undercover work, Burchett
read Utah's statute on criminal entrapment (R. 448-49).

She was

not allowed to actually use drugs in the course of her work; nor
could she offer "exorbitant" sums of money for drugs (R. 363,
447).

Burchett was not permitted to engage in sexual relations

with her undercover contacts, but believed that she could offer
sexual favors for drugs (R. 449). Her supervising officer
indicated that only "implied" sexual offers were permissible (R.
363).

In any case, acting "friendly" toward suspected drug

offenders was part of Burchett's undercover job (R. 449).
Burchett's friendliness toward defendant included
occasional physical touching in the bar where she worked.

On

occasion, Burchett and defendant massaged each other's shoulders.
Burchett engaged in similar affectionate behavior with other bar
customers (R. 240). At the hearing on the pretrial motions,
defendant attempted to characterize these contacts as "erotic"
(R. 291). On cross-examination, however, he admitted that they
took place when the bar was open, and in the presence of other
bar employees (R. 312).
Consistent with her cover as a drug user, Burchett
mentioned marijuana when talking to defendant.
2

After perhaps two

Officer Burchett's undercover operations in Iron County
during the November 1990 throuigh July 1991—the same time period
involved here—are the subject of two other appeals now pending in
this Court, State v. Martinez, No. 920239-CA, and State v.
Levasseur, No. 920444-CA.
5

such references, defendant invited Burchett to share a marijuana
"joint" with him.

Burchett accepted, pretending to smoke the

marijuana (R. 221). On another occasion, at defendant's
direction, Burchett retrieved some marijuana for him from his van
(R. 242). Burchett also told defendant that she was interested
in cocaine.

Defendant "said he would look" for some cocaine, but

did not produce any (R. 242-43, 451).
Defendant told Burchett that he enjoyed watching women
"flashing" their breasts as they travelled area highways (R.
452).

On one occasion Burchette, riding behind defendant on his

motorcycle, feigned a "flash" (R. 453). Defendant claimed that
the "flashing" was Burchett's idea, and that she genuinely
exposed herself (R. 282). However, he had difficulty explaining
how Burchett was able to lift her blouse and lean out so that
defendant could see her breasts in his rearview mirrors, while
simultaneously clinging to him on the moving motorcycle (R. 315).
Defendant eventually asked Burchett if she could help
him obtain a pound of marijuana (R. 221, 245). Burchett
subsequently procured a pound of marijuana through her
supervising officer, and offered to sell it to defendant for 850
dollars (R. 224).
The Arrest and Seizures
Defendant came to Burchett's home to purchase the
marijuana.

Burchett recorded this negotiation via a hidden

transmitting/recording device; her home was also under the
surveillance of police, waiting to arrest defendant (R. 373, 4566

57; transcript at R. 126-33, admitted as defense exhibit D-3A,
copied at Appendix I of this brief)-

Defendant weighed the

marijuana on scales that he had brought with him, and asked to
take it on a 300 dollar deposit.
full payment (R. 225-26).

Burchett declined, requesting

She and defendant agreed to complete

the marijuana sale later that day at defendant's home (R. 227).
Several hours later, still carrying a transmitter/
recorder and under surveillance, Burchett went to defendant's
home (R. 227, 230, 250-51, 456-57).

There defendant paid her an

additional 500 dollars cash, plus a fifty-dollar personal check,
and Burchett gave him the marijuana (R. 228, 458-59).
transaction took place in defendant's kitchen.

This

Defendant took

the marijuana to the open doorway of an adjacent utility room,
and placed it on a shelf in that room, out of immediate sight
from the kitchen (R. 229, 458-61).
During their ensuing conversation, defendant and
Burchett discussed the selling of marijuana (R. 230; transcript
of recorded conversation at R. 134-43, defense exhibit D-4A,
copied at Appendix II of this brief).

Defendant cautioned

Burchett about "narcs," and instructed her about how to sell a
small portion of the marijuana that he had given to Burchett
during the earlier meeting at her home (R. 129, 137-40, 230).
Defendant also asked whether Burchett could obtain another five
pounds of marijuana for him (R. 230).
After a brief tour of defendant's yard and garden,
defendant and Burchett returned to the kitchen (R. 230-31, 254).
7

Apparently upon a signal from Burchett, the surveilling officers
then entered; guns drawn, they ordered defendant to the floor,
handcuffed and arrested him (R. 376, 462-64).

The officers

carried no search warrant, for they had not sought a warrant when
the marijuana transaction site was changed from Burchett's home
to defendant's (R. 251-52, 375).
Burchett promptly directed the arresting officers to
the utility room, where the marijuana was quickly found and
seized (R. 148, 377-78, 464). Defendant stated that this
occurred while he was still prone on the kitchen floor (R. 300),
although other testimony suggested that he may have been moved
from the kitchen to his living room by this time (R. 377, 465).
The arresting officers checked the rest of the house for other
persons, and found nobody (R. 380). They read defendant his
"Miranda" rights, and then asked him if he had any drug
paraphernalia.

Responding "follow me," defendant led the

officers outside to a shed and pointed out his scales, which the
officers seized (R. 306-07, 380).
Pretrial Motions
Defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss, alleging
entrapment, had statutory and constitutional bases.

He argued

that Officer Burchett had entrapped him under Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-303 (1990) (R. 48). He also argued that Burchett's
undercover activity violated the due process clauses of the Utah
and federal constitutions (R. 46).

8

Defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana and scales
challenged the warrantless seizure of these items. He argued
that the marijuana had been seized while outside the area within
his immediate control, such that the "search-incident-to-arrest"
exception to the warrant requirement did not apply (R. 95-96).
He also argued that no other "exigent circumstances" allowed
officers to seize the marijuana without first obtaining a search
warrant (R. 96-100).
Defendant further argued that he had not voluntarily
consented to any search of the premises.

The State did not argue

consent with respect to the marijuana seizure; thus defendant's
"no consent" argument challenged only the seizure of his scales
(R. 118). He argued that under the Utah Constitution, warnings
about the right to refuse consent to search should be required
(R. 101-06).

On appeal, defendant reasserts his entrapment and

illegal search arguments.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant should not have been allowed to preserve his
entrapment argument by entering a conditional guilty plea.

The

function of such a plea is limited to preservation of pretrial
motions to suppress evidence, which are procedural in nature.
However, entrapment is a substantive defense, and Utah's
entrapment statute provides that pretrial entrapment arguments,
if denied, will proceed to trial.

Thus a conditional guilty plea

may not be used to preserve an entrapment argument.

Because the

parties and the trial court failed to recognize this, defendant
9

may be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to
trial; alternatively, he may opt to dismiss his entrapment
argument on appeal.
If defendant's entrapment argument is now entertained,
his pretrial motion to dismiss was properly denied.

There was

ample evidence upon which a jury could have found that defendant
had not been entrapped, and therefore found him guilty of the
charged offense.

Accordingly, his motion to dismiss was properly

rejected under controlling interpretations of Utah's entrapment
statute.

Defendant's constitutional, "due process" entrapment

argument should not be reached, for he does not challenge the
validity of the entrapment statute, which already exceeds federal
due process standards.

Utah's strong separation-of-powers

requirement bars creation of a parallel entrapment definition
under a constitutional analysis where the legislature has already
spoken on the subject.

Therefore, the statute controls the

definition of entrapment under due process principles.
Defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana was
properly denied.

The only question here is whether the marijuana

was seized from an area within defendant's immediate control when
he was arrested.

The legal definition of "within immediate

control" is rather flexible, such that the trial court did not
err in ruling that the marijuana was validly seized incident to
defendant's arrest.

Further, the officers' proper protective

"sweep" of the premises following the arrest would have recovered
the marijuana in any event.

10

The seizure of defendant's scales became a moot issue
when the paraphernalia charge was dropped pursuant to his plea
bargain.

Therefore, in light of the prohibition against

"advisory opinions," the State does not address the "voluntary
consent" argument raised in connection with that issue,
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT CANNOT PRESERVE HIS ENTRAPMENT
ARGUMENT UNDER A CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA; HE
THEREFORE MAY EITHER WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, OR
DISMISS HIS ENTRAPMENT ARGUMENT ON APPEAL.
This Court should not now review defendant's argument
that undercover officer Burchett entrapped him into committing
the offense of possessing a controlled substance with intent to
distribute.

Defendant should not have been allowed to enter a

conditional guilty plea upon the denial of his pretrial
entrapment argument.
A.

He should have proceeded to trial.

Statutory Entrapment is a Substantive Defense,
Ultimately for the Trial Jury to Decide.
The conditional guilty plea is an approved means of

obtaining appellate review of pretrial motions to suppress
evidence based upon constitutional search and seizure rules.
This practice was endorsed in State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 939-40
(Utah App. 1988), and is commonly used in Utah.

However,

appellate review of a motion to suppress evidence merely
establishes whether the State should be "barred from being able
to prove its case because of the illegal seizure of evidence."
Serv, 758 P.2d at 939. Accord State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis.2d 119,
11

332 N.W.2d 744, 749-50 (1983) (principal concern of conditional
plea is review of rulings under the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule).

As such, appellate review of suppression issues is a

procedural question, legitimately undertaken without regard to
the defendant's guilt.
In contrast, an entrapment defense is directed to the
question of guilt or innocence.

Utah's entrapment statute, Utah

Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1990), provides in pertinent part:
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped
into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs
when a law enforcement officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not otherwise
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a
person an opportunity to commit an offense does
not constitute entrapment.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the
court shall hear evidence on the issue and shall
determine as a matter of fact and law whether the
defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. . . .
(5) Should the court determine that the
defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case
with prejudice, but if the court determines the
defendant was not entrapped, such issue may be
presented by the defendant to the jury at trial.
Any order by the court dismissing a case based on
entrapment shall be appealable by the state.
The statute establishes an "objective" test of entrapment, as
contemplated by the Model Penal Code provision from which it was
derived.

State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 502 (Utah 1979)

(comparing statute with section 2.13(1) of the Model Penal Code).
As such, evidence of the accused's predisposition to commit the
crime, a feature of the "subjective" entrapment test, is
12

irrelevant.

Only police conduct is examined, albeit against the

likely response of a hypothetical "average person," "not
otherwise ready to commit" the crime in question, JId. at 503.
Because Utah's statute focuses upon police conduct, the
entrapment question masquerades as a purely procedural one,
seemingly inviting appellate review through a conditional guilty
plea, as permitted with search and seizure issues under Serv.
However, alert reading of the statute, and of caselaw
interpreting it, reveals otherwise.
Even as a procedural matter, the entrapment statute
prescribes the steps to appellate review.

Under subsection (5),

a successful pretrial entrapment argument, resulting in a
dismissal, is appealable by the State.

However, if the pretrial

entrapment argument fails, subsection (5) permits the defendant
to reassert the argument to the jury.

Instructed under the

statute, State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747 (Utah 1984), the jury then
returns a verdict.3

It is readily apparent, therefore, that the

Utah legislature contemplated direct appeal of pretrial
entrapment questions only for the State. A defendant, to obtain
such review, must first be found guilty at trial.
Caselaw also contemplates that pretrial denial of an
entrapment argument does not constitute a finding that there was
3

Under Utah practice, the jury is instructed that the
entrapment defense may raise a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt. See, e.g., Taylor, 599 P.2d at 504 (Crockett,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting jury instruction); State v. Moore, 782
P. 2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989). However, Model Penal Code § 2.13(2)
(1985) places the burden on defendant to establish entrapment by a
preponderance of the evidence.
13

no entrapment.

Instead, such denial is but a provisional

assessment that the question should be resolved at trial. See,
e.g., State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986) (defendant
was not entrapped "as a matter of law," and the question "was
properly left to the jury"); State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369
(Utah 1980) (same).

Thus pretrial rejection of an entrapment

defense is not akin to a final judgment, as is the denial of a
motion to suppress evidence, that might be appealed through a
conditional guilty plea.

Instead, the issue remains open, as a

substantive defense to guilt.
A defendant cannot preserve a substantive defense for
appellate review by entering a conditional guilty plea.

On

appeal, such a plea amounts to a self-contradictory assertion of
"guilty but not guilty."

This is fundamentally different from a

plea preserving evidence suppression issues, where the defendant
asserts "guilty but prosecution is barred."

Under Utah's

entrapment statute, then, only rejection of the entrapment
defense at trial, leading to a guilty verdict, gives rise to a
final decision from which the defendant may appeal, consistently
maintaining an argument that he or she is "not guilty."

The

statute does not permit a guilty plea, effectively conceding the
absence of entrapment, followed by an appellate opportunity to
revoke that concession.
Sound jurisprudence also weighs against permitting
appellate review of denied, pretrial entrapment arguments through
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a conditional guilty plea.

First, the Utah Constitution contains

an explicit separation-of-powers provision:
The powers of the government of the State
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive,
and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
Utah Const. Art. V, § 1.

In Serv, 758 P.2d at 939, this Court

permitted the use of conditional guilty pleas to preserve
suppression issues only after noting that the legislature was
silent on the issue.

However, in the entrapment statute, the

Utah legislature has spoken on how entrapment questions may reach
appellate courts. An alteration of the legislature's decision by
this Court, permitting entrapment to be decided through a
conditional guilty plea, without trial, would violate the Utah
Constitution.
Second, " [i]t is not the function of a reviewing court
to determine guilt or innocence or judge the credibility of
witnesses," or otherwise sit as a first-line factfinder.
v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991).

State

As already

discussed, the entrapment statute is a tool for deciding guilt or
innocence.

Further, here defendant and Officer Burchett gave

conflicting testimony on a number of facts relating to
entrapment.

This Court, which will never see nor hear these

witnesses, cannot decide which one to believe.

Cf.. Taylor, 599

P.2d at 505 (Crockett, C.J., dissenting) ("I have no desire to
15

join in becoming a super-jury to free this defendant").

As set

forth in Warden, this appellate court cannot sit as a jury to try
this case.
Finally, when a defendant proceeds to trial and
succeeds in an entrapment defense, an acquittal results, and
potential appellate issues become moot.

Here this is true both

with regard to defendant's statutory entrapment claim, and to his
"due process"-based entrapment argument.

Regarding the latter

argument, it is a fundamental principle that appellate courts
should not decide constitutional issues in advance of the
necessity of doing so.
(Utah 1985).

State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103

Because defendant's statutory entrapment defense

could conceivably succeed at trial, mooting his constitutional
argument, it is not necessary to consider that argument now.
On the other hand, if defendant is found guilty at
trial, both his statutory and due process entrapment claims can
be reviewed on appeal, and upon a more complete evidentiary
record than now exists. As things stand now, defendant is asking
this Court to prematurely pass judgment on the entrapment
question.
B.

This Court should decline to do so.
Conditional Guilty Pleas Preserving Entrapment
Arguments Should be Prospectively Prohibited;
Defendant Should Either Withdraw this Guilty Plea,
or Dismiss his Appellate Entrapment Argument.
This Court recently reviewed a pretrial entrapment

argument, preserved through a conditional guilty plea, in State
v. Richardson, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. Nov. 25, 1992).
It further appears that another such case is now pending in this
16

Court, State v. Bryant, No. 920232-CA.

As just set forth, the

State now believes that this is procedurally improper.

The

practice should be prospectively discontinued.
In fact, in denying a pretrial, entrapment-based motion
to dismiss, the Richardson trial court did not find that
defendant had not been entrapped.

Instead, it was merely "not

persuaded" that the defendant had been entrapped.

Richardson,

201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45 (Bench, P.J., concurring) (quoting trial
court's ruling).

This was entirely consistent with the State's

analysis here: where entrapment is not so certain as to be "a
matter of law," it is for the jury to decide.
In sum, a trial court's pretrial rejection of a
statutory entrapment argument is merely a "gatekeeping" decision
that the jury should decide the issue.

Because the parties and

the trial court mistakenly presumed that a conditional guilty
plea was permissible to allow appellate review of defendant's
entrapment argument, defendant should be allowed to withdraw his
guilty plea, if he so desires, and proceed to trial.

See State

v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis.2d 119, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983) (where state
erroneously agreed to entry of a conditional plea, the defendant
was permitted to withdraw it).

If his entrapment defense fails

at trial, it can then be reviewed on a subsequent appeal.
Alternatively, defendant may dismiss his entrapment claim on
appeal, and proceed solely on his evidentiary suppression issues.
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POINT TWO
EVEN IF CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME, DEFENDANT'S
ENTRAPMENT ARGUMENT WOULD FAIL.
Perhaps defendant's guilty plea might be treated as a
guilty verdict, rendered by the bench upon the hearing of his
entrapment argument.

If this is possible, or if this Court

otherwise deems it proper to now review the pretrial denial of
defendant's entrapment argument, that argument cannot prevail, on
statutory or "due process" grounds.
A.

There is Sufficient Evidence to Reject Defendant's
Statutory Entrapment Defense, and to Support a
Guilty Verdict.
However this Court might choose to review defendant's

entrapment-based motion to dismiss, its standard of review must
be deferential.

As in reviewing a jury verdict, appellate courts

uphold the denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence so long as "some evidence exists from which a reasonable
jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt."

State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,

1225 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).

The same standard applies to

a verdict returned against an entrapment defense.

State v.

Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 132 (Utah 1986).
This standard is amply satisfied here. A jury
obviously could choose to believe the testimony of Officer
Burchett over that of defendant.

Thus it could find that

Burchett did no more than behave in a friendly, somewhat
flirtatious manner toward defendant, and that she inquired,
without demanding, whether defendant could obtain drugs. A jury
18

could also find that the purchase of the pound of marijuana,
leading to the charges in question, was initiated by defendant,
and that defendant even asked to purchase an additional five
pounds of marijuana from Burchett.
Under the entrapment standard of section 76-2-303,
then, a jury could readily find that Burchett's undercover
actions did not create "a substantial risk that the offense would
be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it," and could
find instead that Burchett did no more than afford defendant "an
opportunity to commit an offense."

It could therefore find,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was not entrapped, and
find him guilty of the drug possession charge.
Such a finding would be upheld on appeal.

Under the

statute, and viewing the evidence in the most favorable light,
Udell, 728 P.2d at 132, Utah appellate courts consistently refuse
to overturn guilty verdicts, and find entrapment, in the absence
of "personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals to extreme
vulnerability" by police agents.
62 (Utah 1986).

State v. Martin, 713 P.2d 60,

See, e.g., State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 501

(Utah 1989) ("no pleas of desperation or appeals based primarily
on sympathy or close personal friendship"); Udell, 728 P.2d at
132 (no entrapment where officer shared cocaine with defendant
once, then made four additional cocaine requests over the next
five weeks); State v. Belt, 780 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Utah App. 1989)
(no resort to "pity, sympathy, or money"); State v. Wvnia, 754
P.2d 667, 670 (Utah App.) (no high-pressure tactics, "[a]ll the
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officers had to do was ask" for drugs), cert, denied, 765 P.2d
1278 (Utah 1988); State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah App.
1987) ("no pleas of desperation or appeals to friendship or
loyalty").

Compare State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465, 467-68 (Utah

1987) (agent presented herself as an attractive single mother
experiencing hard times); State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 497-99,
503-04 (Utah 1979) (agent was the defendant's recent lover, and
pleaded with him for heroin to alleviate her withdrawal
sickness).

By comparison here, Burchette used no high-pressure,

extreme tactics that would have created a "substantial risk" that
an average person would respond as defendant did.
Given all this, the trial court clearly did not err in
denying defendant's entrapment-based motion to dismiss.

Nor

would a trial factfinder—jury or judge—have clearly erred in
finding defendant guilty.
B.

Defendant's Constitution-Based Entrapment Argument
Fails Because this Case is Controlled by Utah's
Entrapment Statute.
1.

Federal Analysis.

Defendant's constitutional, "due process"-based
entrapment argument, while creative, cannot prevail.

He argues

that Officer Burchett's investigative conduct here was
"outrageous," "conscience shocking," or "fundamentally repugnant"
(Br. of Appellant at 16-18), along the lines of conduct
condemned, and held to violate federal due process principles, in
United States v. Twiqq, 588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978).

In Twiqq,

however, government agents, through an informant, assisted the
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defendant in setting up a drug laboratory—providing chemicals,
laboratory equipment, and even a house for the laboratory site.
588 F.2d at 375. Apparently without this extraordinary
assistance, the defendant would have been unable to even commit
the charged crime of illegal drug manufacturing.
More recently, in Jacobson v. United States,

U.S.

, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992), the United States Supreme Court
reversed a conviction for receiving child pornography through the
mail.A

In Jacobson, a two-and-a-half year campaign by federal

agents, posing as pornography sellers, and including over two
dozen mailings, had finally induced the defendant to order the
prohibited material.

112 S. Ct. at 1538-41. The Jacobson

campaign also asked the defendant to join in a lobbying effort
against anti-pornography "censorship."

.Id. at 1542.

Officer Burchett's undercover operations here fall well
short of the investigative overreaching in Twigg and Jacobson.
Contrary to defendant's argument, Burchett did not extend him
excess credit, enabling him to make an otherwise unaffordable
marijuana purchase.

In fact, Burchett refused to deliver the

marijuana upon his initial proffer of a 300 dollar down payment.
Instead, she insisted on full payment, and compromised only to
the extent of the fifty-dollar check toward the full 850 dollar
price.

Nor did Burchett resort to a long-term campaign, along

A

Jacobson turned upon the subjective, federal entrapment test,
and the prosecution's failure to establish the defendant's
predisposition to commit the charged crime. Nevertheless, the
government conduct in Jacobson is illustratively useful for its
contrast with Officer Burchett's conduct here.
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the lines of Jacobson, to induce defendant's criminal act.
Instead, her contact with defendant lasted only some eight or
nine months, and was primarily social in nature.
2.

State Analysis,

On the state side, defendant takes historical note of
"popular mistrust and hostility toward government" among the
drafters of state constitutions.

See Flynn, Federalism and

Viable State Government; the History of Utah's Constitution, 1966
Utah L. Rev. 311, 314 (quoted in Br. of Appellant at 19).
However, a fundamental feature of state constitutions is their
establishment of democracy—that is, government by the people
themselves.
Here the people of Utah, through their legislature,
have defined the parameters of entrapment by statute.

Defendant

has not challenged that statute under due process grounds, and
indeed, as a product of the democratic process, it carries a
presumption of constitutional validity.

See Michigan v.

DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632 (1979).

That

presumption is so strong that the Utah Supreme Court has stated
that a statute will be struck down only if it is shown to be
unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt."

State v. Bell, 785

P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989).
Further, defendant does not cite, nor has the State
found, Utah caselaw expressing any doubt about the constitutional
validity of the entrapment statute.

He cannot bypass the

statute, and argue for a parallel, more defense-favorable
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entrapment standard under the state constitution.

That argument

invites this Court to perform legislative functions that, as set
forth earlier, are forbidden to it under the separation-of-powers
requirement of Utah Constitution.
Seen in the foregoing light, it is readily apparent
that defendant's "due process" arguments are subsumed within
Utah's entrapment statute, as authoritatively construed by Utah
courts.

His complaint that Officer Burchett's undercover

activity was "outrageous" must be analyzed in light of the
statute's more sober terminology, and the caselaw that has
developed under it. As already set forth, Burchett's conduct was
acceptable under the statute.
In fact, Utah's entrapment statute already exceeds
federal due process standards.

Federal courts apply a subjective

test, so that a defendant who raises the entrapment defense
invites exposure of his or her past conduct and character.
Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500. Because Utah's statute adopts an
objective test, focusing only on police conduct, defendants may
utilize the defense free from risk that as a result, they may be
unfairly convicted based upon past conduct and character
evidence.

See State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747, 749-50 & n.3 (it

was reversible error to give an entrapment instruction that may
have caused the jury to focus on the defendant's disposition).
Thus as a matter of fundamental fairness, the due process
standard contained within Utah's entrapment statute is already
more defense-favorable than the federal standard.
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In State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1988), the
Utah Supreme Court did consider both statutory and due processbased entrapment arguments.

However, the latter argument was

reached only after a determination that the statutory entrapment
defense was unavailable to the defendant, because the charged
crime contained an element of causing or threatening bodily
injury.

766 P.2d at 1064-65 (interpreting subsection 76-6-303(2)

of the entrapment statute).

That justification for reaching a

constitutional entrapment argument is not present here.
If reached, defendant's due process argument fails.
The Colonna court criticized an undercover officer who had
provided and shared drugs and alcohol with defendant.

He had

also provided transportation for a robbery committed by the
defendant, and participated in the robbery to such a degree that
the victim was more fearful of the officer than of the defendant.
766 P.2d at 1065-66 & n.2. Nevertheless, the supreme court
concluded that the officer's conduct was "not so extreme as to
constitute a due process violation under either the Utah or the
United States Constitution."

jCd. at 1066 (emphasis added).

Here Officer Burchett stopped well short of the
undercover conduct in Colonna.

She provided drugs to defendant,

but only at a price; the drugs she pretended to consume with
defendant were provided by him, not her.

She engaged in some

flirtatious behavior and some feigned lewdness, but no crime of
violence was involved.

Thus even if this Court might engage in a

parallel constitutional analysis, separate from the statutory
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entrapment analysis, Burchett's undercover activity clearly
passes muster under controlling precedent,
POINT THREE
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE SUPPRESSION ISSUES MAY
NOT BE PRESENTLY REACHABLE; IF REACHED, THE
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED HIS MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM HIS HOME.
Defendant next challenges the denial of his motion to
suppress the marijuana and the weighing scales seized from his
home.

As a threshold matter, it is questionable whether this

point on appeal should even be reached at this time.

To the

extent it may be reached, the trial court correctly rejected the
motion to suppress.
A.

The Unusual Procedural Stance of this Case May
Preclude Consideration of the Suppression Issue at
This Time.
The procedural peculiarity of this case weighs against

consideration of the search and seizure issue at this time.

If

defendant withdraws his guilty plea, as suggested in Point One of
this brief, this case returns to pretrial status.

In that event,

his motion to suppress evidence would be open to review only as
an interlocutory appeal.

On the other hand, as set forth in

Point Two, perhaps defendant's plea-supported conviction might be
reviewed as a guilty verdict, rejecting defendant's entrapment
defense, on the drug possession charge.
Either of the foregoing possibilities, however, raises
new questions.

If the guilty plea is withdrawn, defendant should

first satisfy this Court that interlocutory review of the
evidence suppression issues is appropriate under Rule 5, Utah
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Rules of Appellate Procedure.

If his plea is treated as a guilty

verdict, however, admission of the contraband in question is
susceptible, in part, to harmless error analysis.

It is also, in

part, a moot issue.
Regarding unlawful drug possession, the pound of
marijuana supporting that charge presumably can be traced from
police hands into defendant's possession.

Adding in the money

defendant paid to Burchett for the marijuana, the portion of the
marijuana defendant left with Burchett, plus Burchett's testimony
and the transcripts of the surreptitiously recorded sale, it
seems that defendant's guilt is a foregone conclusion, with no
need to admit the marijuana into evidence.

Accordingly,

admission of the marijuana into evidence would be harmless error.
See Chambers v. Maronev, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1982
(1970) (conviction upheld where possibly erroneous admission of
evidence under the Fourth Amendment was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576-79, 106 S.
Ct. 3101,

(1986) (discussing harmless constitutional error).
A similar harmless error analysis might apply to the

paraphernalia charge, where defendant's scales are the contraband
in question.

However, mootness disposes of this question.

The

paraphernalia charge was dropped pursuant to defendant's plea
bargain.

"A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial

relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants."
Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989).

Burkett v.

A ruling from this

Court that defendant's scales were not seized pursuant to his
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voluntary consent, and therefore should have been suppressed,
cannot affect his drug possession conviction, which is the only
conviction under review.

Thus the seizure of the scales is a

moot issue that, under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(mootness), is not susceptible to appellate review.
The evidence suppression issues advanced on appeal thus
present, at best, harmless error.

If those issues are now

addressed, this Court's resolution of them will amount to an
advisory opinion, which is generally disfavored.

See Meadow

Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1220-21 &
n.8 (Utah App. 1991).

At the very least, defendant should be

required to clarify the procedural pathway he wishes to follow,
before this Court addresses the suppression questions.
B.

To the Extent Reachable on this Appeal, the Trial
Court's Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence Should be Affirmed.
As just shown, defendant's challenge to the seizure of

his scales is moot.

Accordingly, the State will not address the

merits of that issue.

Only the seizure of the marijuana,

supporting the appealed-from conviction, will be addressed.
1.

The Marijuana:

Search Incident to Arrest.

The trial court ruled that the marijuana was properly
seized from defendant's utility room incident to his lawful
arrest (R. 148, copied in the addendum to Br. of Appellant).
Defendant did not challenge the lawfulness of his in-home arrest
in the trial court, nor does he raise such challenge on appeal.
Accordingly, that possible issue has been waived.
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State v.

Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1984), reversed in part on
other grounds, State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987).

Only

the lack of a search warrant is assailed.
With the lawfulness of the arrest conceded, the only
remaining question is whether the marijuana was in an area within
defendant's "immediate control" when he was arrested.

If so, the

it was validly seized under the "search incident to arrest"
exception to the search warrant requirement, set forth in Chime1
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-68, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040-43
(1969).

Under governing law, the seizure was valid.
This Court has noted that the area within an arrestee's

"immediate control" is defined rather flexibly.

See State v.

Harrison, 805 P. 2d 769, 784-85 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

The fact that the arrestee is physically

restrained, for example, does not prohibit a warrantless search
into nearby areas into which, "generally, if not inevitably," he
or she might reach.

Harrison, 805 P.2d at 784-85 n.29 (quoting

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864
(1981)).

Therefore in Harrison, a diaper bag was held properly

searched incident to the defendant's arrest, even though he was
lying on the ground at the time, under guard, some ten feet away
from the bag.

805 P.2d at 784-85.

So holding, this Court

followed Utah precedent holding searches to be properly "incident
to arrests," even though the arrestees had been effectively
restrained.

Id. at 784 (citing, among others, State v. Kent, 665

P.2d 1317, 1318 (Utah 1983) (search of automobile was proper even
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though arrestee was handcuffed and lying on ground next to car)).
Accord State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, 856 (Utah 1978) (arrestee
need not be able to move about in order to justify search
incident to arrest).
This case is well in line with Harrison and its
supporting precedent.

Defendant testified that the marijuana was

seized from his utility room as he lay, just arrested, on his
kitchen floor (R. 300). By his own measurement, he was then only
about ten feet away from the adjoining utility room at that time
(R. 301), the same rough distance between the arrestee and the
searched item in Harrison.

Nor did the fact that defendant was

restrained remove the utility room from the area within his
"immediate control," as that term has been construed.

Given

this, it is readily apparent that the marijuana was validly
sought and seized incident to defendant's arrest.
It is also significant that, unlike the situation in
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 754, 89 S. Ct. at 2035, the officers here did
not find and seize the marijuana upon widespread rummaging
throughout defendant's home.

Instead, they limited the immediate

search to the close-by area where Burchett had seen defendant
deposit the marijuana.

Because the officers thus stayed well

within the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest, cf.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762, 89 S. Ct. at 2039-40, and State v.
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986), the search was valid
under well-established search and seizure principles.
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Thus the

trial court correctly ruled that the marijuana was validly seized
incident to defendant's arrest.
2.

The Marijuana:

Inevitable Discovery.

The trial court also noted that the arresting officers
were permitted to make a cursory sweep of defendant's home upon
his arrest (R. 148). In fact, the officers did make such a
sweep, confirming Officer Burchett's belief that no other persons
were hiding in the home (R. 380, 465-66).
such a protective measure is proper.

Under settled law,

See State v. Kellyf 718

P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986), and State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 78
(Utah App. 1990) (both citing authorities); accord Maryland v.
Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990).
Thus even if the officers could not have looked into
defendant's utility room as an area within his immediate personal
control, they were permitted to do so as part of their cursory,
protective sweep.

See Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S. Ct. at

("the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other
spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an
attack could be immediately launched").

There the marijuana,

recognizable as probable criminal evidence, would have come into
plain view, and would have been lawfully subject to seizure
without a warrant.

See Kellv, 718 P.2d at 390.

The marijuana would have thus been seized in the
foregoing, independently legal fashion, even if it were deemed
not properly seized under the more traditional "incident to
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arrest" standard.

See id. at 392; accord Murray v. United

States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-41, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2533-35 (1988)
(explaining "independent source" and "inevitable discovery"
rules).

The trial court properly assigned this alternative basis

to deny defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana.
CONCLUSION
Given the problems with defendant's conditional guilty
plea, and questions of prematurely-presented issues, harmless
error, and mootness, this case presents a procedural conundrum.
Before this appeal proceeds further, defendant should be required
to clarify the procedural pathway he wishes to follow.

As things

presently stand, only some of the issues presented on appeal may
properly be addressed.

On the merits of those issues, however,

defendant's conviction can be affirmed.
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APPENDIX I
Transcript of Marijuana Transaction in Burchett's Home
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7/30/91
Morning/Reverse
Don Keitz
Page 1

Tape begins with static for approximately 17 seconds
You found it. Laugh
Inaudible
Inaudible
Static for approximately 23 seconds
It was my fault, I shouldn't have asked

(inaudible) pick it up at my house.

Inaudible
Huh?
Inaudible

- early for me.

Oh yeah, I got a lot of shit going on

(inaudible)

Tape cuts in and out for approximately 2 seconds
Inaudible
people
(inaudible)
because people schedule me
do rrorning, you know, if were gonna do something make sure, a.

(inaudible) people

You want seme water, er.
No, thanks, I'm fine. Yeah
make a habit of this do ya?
No, not at all.
Inaudible
Tape cuts in and out
Well.
Inaudible
Tape cuts in and out
Inaudible
Inaudible
Tape cuts in and out
Should be good.
Yeah.

(inaudible)

I got to put a little ice on this. You don't

Morning/Reverse
Don Keitz
Page 2

Inaudible
Tape cuts in and out
Inaudible
That's

- here.
(inaudible)

Ok.
I don't have any

(inaudible)

I got.
Tape cuts in and out
Uwui.
Inaudible

-

laugh

Ok
Tape cuts in and out
Inaudible

- for the deal.

Tape cuts in and out/static for approximately 6 seconds
Inaudible - two (inaudible) by 4:00 it should be wrapped up and by 5:00 (inaudible)
at the very latest I'll just go to the bank (inaudible) you know, if they fuck me up
but they won't, ok. It's money that is owed me you know, I don't want to make more trips
and I don't want you guys to either. I'll take this in a heartbeat. Is that cool,
Annie? We'll see how much is there to. A, ok, I got three (inaudible) more than
enough for it, more than 850 for it (inaudible)
He'll get pissed of it's gone.
Well,

(inaudible)

Inaudible
Well, Annie, would that be cool? What if I get back by 5:00. I've got one more
(inaudible). This is nice, I don't want to let it go. Is that cool?
Tape cuts in and out
Let's see what we got here, Annie.
Well, if it's short I don't have any spare.

1'uo.i.;,-

7/30/91
Morning/Reverse
Don Keitz
Page 3

Tape cuts in and out
Bear.
Approximately 9 seconds of static
Inaudible
Inaudible
Yeah it is. That's why I wanted to take a little bit but I don't want to put you on the
hot seat either. A, but lets don't (inaudible) you know, we'll get him his money
(inaudible) trust me little one, trust me dear.
Inaudible
Where's your little calculator?

You got one?

Static for approximately 2 seconds
Oh, Annie

(inaudible)

Static/inaudible conversation for approximatley 1 minute
And what do you want out of it?
l/8th
Inaudible
- you mean, an eighth of a pound.
How about an ounce?

Heck, it's worth more than that to me.

Inaudible
This is over, Annie.
It's over?
Yeah.
Really?
A, we don't know with this bag here, between 10 and 13.5 (inaudible)
Inaudible conversation for approximately 14 seconds
Inaudible
Yeah

- (inaudible conversation)

Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 14 seconds
Inaudible

- that's nice you got

(inaudible)

,**.*•
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Laugh
There was all kinds of fuckin' whiff up in Salt Lake.
Was there really?
Yeah, I don't know, I said, I should have just brought you some.
I would have traded that. Laugh
I'll bring you, hey, I'll bring you same you know, the next time I get around it, I just
don't do it anymore.
Hi tun.

Ok, let's see

(inaudible) zero everything

(inaudible)

Good.
Ok
(inaudible conversation) So, here we go (inaudible conversation) see all this
(inaudible) yeah, I'll be right fuckin' back, I promise you, Annie, I won't fuck you
up with this stuff, ok. You'll meet your deadline, he won't even know. Who is he
anyhow? Any relation to Ira Schqppmann? (inaudible)
Who?
The sheriff.
Not that I know of.
Ok (inaudible) a pound is 448 to 458 plus the bag, right (inaudible) ok we're over.
It's 46 (inaudible) how about I can see why he wants that cash now, I got to get it
for him. Annie, close that window.
Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 5 seconds
Four.
Static for approximately 12 seconds
I say 456 or 476 ok, here we go 476 minue 448 oh
fuckin' pound.

(inaudible) 16 there's 28, there's a

An ounce, an ounce over?
Over, for you is that cool?
That's

(inaudible)

Now, I'm gonna get on my ass and go get this money and get it back to you.
You sure they aren't going to be waiting for me out there, huh?
Inaudible

(inaudible)
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Huh, everything cool, Annie?

(inaudible)

Want me to come with ya?
Yeah.
But I don't want.
Inaudible
I don't want him, I don't want him to oame back and.
He won't, I'll be here before he gets here.
Let me go with you. Laugh
You can do that to if you want but I've got to a, a.
Cause I don't want to be here and not have the money or the stuff.
You want to go with me to round it up?
Ok.
Or should I oome back?
It doesn't matter, but I don't, I don't want to be here without the money.
How about if you a, hmrn, you, you won't even give me 2 hours, huh, to do it? The
guys, the money from Brian Head will be there between 2:00 to 3:00. And that's
525 bucks right there that's, (inaudible) see that's (inaudible) right there.
You have to go up to Brian Head to get it?
No, there coming to Parowan. There doing work there today and they'll oame by. I
won't burn you on it, Annie. Let me leave you the 3 and I'll get the rest back by
3:00 ok, cause I got 2 more places to go to. Is that cool?
What are you saying?

(inaudible)

Well you can. You can do that to.
Inaudible
Ok, so you a, you want me to measure out a, a, ounce? I don't work (inaudible),
Annie, sure that'll work to, no problem, your the boss. And then you'll, don't let
anybody else in here, ok?
Yeah.
Alright, perfect, perfect, and then I won't have to be eating my words but I want the
mother fucker, ok?
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Alright, good girl. There you go

(inaudible)

Tape cuts in and out
Inaudible

-

I'd sit on it, there isn't stuff.

Tape cuts in and out
Inaudible

- that's over 28, ok?

Let me see, it's oh, ok, this is the
Inaudible

(inaudible)

- alright, you dig it?

Inaudible
Ok, let's do that. Now you will bring this to me, I'm gonna leave you the 300 hundred
ok and that'll fill it and I'll get (inaudible) the rest. Right fuckin' now.
Ok.
Alright, Annie, good girl, I'm gonna take one of these for a, a joint when I get home
ok? (inaudible) That makes more sense, Annie, I don't want you (inaudible)
Ok.
Inaudible

- alright.

Ok, call me as soon as you get*
I will, as soon as I get, how long will you be here?
Oh

(inaudible)

Ok.
I don't know if my boyfriend will drop by.
Well, then

(inaudible) a, look, Annie, you want a

(inaudible) I owe you 550

Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 35 seconds
Most people don't they either love it or they don't like it
Static approximately 6 seconds
I'll go get
Inaudible
Yeah, I will.

(inaudible)
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How a, you'll bring this to me?
Inaudible
To Parowan?
To Parowan.
Ok, let me tell ya
Static for approximately 23 seconds
What are you doing this evening?
Going out I hope. Laugh
Laugh
Laugh

(inaudible) you must be

(inaudible) right?

No, Maureen? Hey, is there any money at home?
Fine. Ok. Ok, see ya. Bye (inaudible)

Where is it? Oh, I'll talk to ya later.

Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 7 seconds
A, new how you gonna bring that over, Annie?
Static/tape cuts in and out for approximately 15 seconds
I'm in Parowan.

(inaudible)

I'm in Parowan.

Static/tape cuts in and out for approximately 25 seconds
The address is 389 North 100

(inaudible)

Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 12 seconds
Inaudible

- oh

Inaudible - 400 north, now what this is here this corner, this is called the state
road (inaudible)
Static/inaudible conversation for approximately 1 minute
Phone rings
Ok
Phone rings
Static/tape cuts in and out/inaudible conversation for approximately 6^5 minutes
Tape ends
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Don Keitz

CI:
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A, its alright, its comin'.

What's you up to?

Inaudible
Inaudible
Really.
Inaudible - a, solor

(inaudible).

It's solor power?
Well, not power it's just a plastic. But that heats, in the winter.
Hey, we got one little problem, come on iin, your probably gonna kick
my ass. But, a, well shit..
Inaudible
Inaudible. Were fifty dollars: short, i!can give you a check, I would
rather, I would, here's what I would like to do. I would like to give
you, a check then come down and-buy it firom you tomorrow night.
Tomorrow night?
Urn huh.

Good girl!

Good girl.

(inaudible)

Your fifty dollars short?
Yeah.
I have fifty dollars.
Ok, cover me Annie, cover me, now heres the other thing I want you to
know, that wasn't exactly an ounce over,1it was eighteen (18) grams over,
I gave you ten (10) grams, ten grams is $ quarter and almost a half ounce
is a quarter and a half, you know what I'm sayin1? Ten grams, a, quarter
of an ounce is seven grams, an ounce is 28. I gave you ten grams of mine,
see we didn't compensate for the bag.
Ok.
That way, we weighed it and then but the other way to, I'll be ten short
on it because that's what I want you to have.
Urn k.
You get it?
Ok.
Ok.
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CI:

Alright.

DK:

The ten grams is from me, you don't just get the overload, you got the
eighteen, we were actually eighteen over and the bag was ten.

CI:

Ok.

DK:

Remember that trip.

CI:

Alrighty.

DK:

Another ten because that should last somebody like you a long time.

CI:

Oh, yeah.

DK:

Gosh, smoke that and just started going to work now. Well, hey, I like
so, well, will you do that? Do you want to take a check?

CI:

I'll take a check.

DK:

That'll work.

CI:

Well.

DK:

Will you cash it tomorrow?

CI:

Wait till tomorrow?

DK:

Yeah, see I got, in fact, I'm not gonna even have it in the bank till li)
five o'clock. Is that gonna fuck you up, Annie?

CI:

What's, what's the first?

DK:

Yeah, I get paid, no tomorrow is the 31st.

CI:

Ok, Because yeah, I just want to get my rent, you know, paid, it's got
right on the first, but I can write a check so that'll hold it over to
you, you know, so I can wait.

DK:

What if you cash mine like tomorrow at a.

CI:

After three or somethin'?

DK:

I don't know if I'll get it in there by that time.

CI:

I can wait till.

DK:

Can you give me a day?

CI:

Till Thursday.

DK:

Fuck man, yeah, yeah, day after, then I know it's in there, ok?

Ok.

The first is tomorrow right?
I get paid tomorrow.

VOSC
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Ok.
Your a good kid.

Fifty, one, twenty, forty.

How much do you think I can get fer like an eighth of mine, (inaudible)
Eighty, two.
But I can't

(inaudible)

Wait, twenty, forty, (inaudible) forty, sixty, eighty, four, twenty,
forty, sixty, eighty, five, were fifty short, you count that now, so
we know, Annie.
One.
Well, that's over.
Three, four.
Five. Ok, now listen, I'm gonna write this check, if you'll wait that day
after, I can probably, I'll probably come .and buy that check back from ya.
I hate checks.
Urn k. I'll hold on to it then.

Until Friday morning.

If you don't see me it's to bad, you cash the sucker.
Urn k.

I'11 hold on to.

Static, inaudible conversation approximately 7 seconds
A hundred will come as soon as you leave.
Really?
Yeah, this is a whole different round up bullshit where I got this.
alright, Annie.
How much do you think I could sell an eighth?
How much are you gonna sell is what I want to know.
I'm just, I just want to keep like an eighth.
Oh, really?
Uh huh.
For you, now this is that full boogey?
Right.

But,
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DK:

We didn't touch it or nothin'?

CI:

Except for the stuff that, a, you gave me and then that little piece that
you took.

DK:

Perfect, Annie.

CI:

And that's it.

DK:

Annie, now your cookin'.

CI:

Shit, I don't have scales.

DK:

All you were gonna sell is an eighth and you just want to keep it

CI:

Yeah, I wanted, I wanted to keep an eighth.

DK:

Eighth for money. Ok, I'll tell you what to do
(inaudible)
the boyfriend? Is he nervious about me? Does he know me er?

CI:

He doesn't smoke pot and he doesn't like me even smokin' it.

DK:

Did he hear my phone call?

CI:

Uh huh (negative)

DK:

Ok. Now (inaudible) here's the check, let me get this to ya first.
Ok, I'm gonna put that this is for some speakers or somethin'. I hope I
come around and buy it, where will you be tomorrow night, at, tomorrow
night about seven?

CI:

I'll probably be in the Playhouse.

DK:

Just call, yeah, yeah.

DK:

I don't want to stir things up with your old man.

CI:

I won't, I don't go there till like at nine.

DK:

People like that drop dimes, now don't take that personal and I hope he
doesn't but I've seen more jealous boyfriends, you know what I mean?

CI:

Yeah.

DK:

You know exactly what I'm talkin1 to, I'm talkin' to a pro here.

CI:

Laugh

DK:

Ok, fifty. I never write checks, Annie. Let's see, to the order, a, oka
this is your name here, huh, Annie. Annie what?

CI:

Beckstead.

Ok, a,

B e c k s t e a d .

(inaudible)

countin'.

What abou
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What if Friday, your boyfriend saw this check, would he ask you a bunch
of shit?
Uh huh (negative) he won't see it.
Oh Bullshit!
He won't see it, anyway.
Right!

Laugh

(inaudible), Annie.

This is a, I'm gonna date this tomorrow, ok?

Ok.
Because I went and drew some money out of there.
and 2 and coming up with 5 and shit. Ok, a.

I don't want to put 2

Inaudible
Inaudible

- ninety one, fifty.

God, your house is gorgeous.
Thanks, it's a mess.
I like the way you can just walk right here on the back porch.
Yeah, I'll have ta actually get this bullshit out of the way, we'll a,
I'll take you on a little tour. Ok, can I just tell you a couple things.
Yeah.
This area is riddled with fuckin' narcs.
subdivision.

There are narcs living in your

In mine?
Yeah, I recognized it as I was comin' home. Down, maybe it's further
toward Kanarra is there another place like that a little further down?
No, it's that one.
It's like a subdivision?
Yeah.
All along that road to Kanarraville theres.
Ok, it's in one of those further towards Kanarra, anyway, I want you to
get all moved. Don't fuck around with the telephone, Annie.
Really?
Like we did today, God, that's so bad.
iust have a rprnrHinn

re
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No, I'm not.

You aren't are you?

Laugh

Please don't be.
Laugh
I worry more about your boyfriends than I do anything else.
Oh, right.
Those speakers.

Two speakers.

Cool.
And I'd like to buy that back from ya, is that where I'd have to come is
to the Playhouse to see you?"'
No, just, I'm usually home about seven, I don't go over there till about
nine.
Oh, ok, between seven and nine you might be home.
Yeah.
If you were I'd run it down in another clar.
give you the money and take this back.

The old lady's

(inaudible)

Urn k.
These things right here, the telephone will put you in jail. These are
the two biggest fuckin' ways there is, I.'m serious. It's easy for em. 0
now, here we go. You got, you got one ounce, you got 28 grams, you want
a, I'd keep a quarter, sell three quarters and keep a quarter, cause ther
ain't any weed, Annie. This is like something that has fallen out of the
sky.
Urn k.
Did he say anything that he can get more than this?
He was talkin', you know, I asked him and he is such a grump sometimes,
though.
Uh huh

(inaudible)

Inaudible
Will you give him all of his money, please.
Yes.
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Yeah,
Alright, I'll get back to ya in other ways. Also, look at these squash
man, I want to take some of these, we've saved a lot of marriages in the
past with these.
Laugh
You go through there and get what you need little one.
You have a garden, huh?
Here's what I'll do, Annie. Is the way things are right now, sell three
quarters at $60 a piece. Don't sell them at $50.
Don't sell them at 50?
No madam, and after the deer hunt, the crops come back in, then it's all
over. Right now get 60 or don't do it. That'll give you 180 and that'll
leave you with a whole quarter for yourself.
Ok.
See, if you can make a quarter last, if you go to an eighth, your gonna
smoke up with friends, these friends are selfish, soon as they run out
there gonna come and smoke that.
Inaudible
I know how this works, Annie.

Laugh

Ok.
This is funny were doing this.
Laugh
It's wonderful.
Oh, wouldn't Corky die?
Well good,

(inaudible)

Yeah.
Good for you.
Yeah, if I can pull it off.
If what?
If

T nan
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Put it into force.
Now listen, the way that is, you can probably just eye that quarter.
You think so?
Absolutely. Don't even mess, don't even (inaudible) you can just
(inaudible) you think this is, thats why you never see me at the
Playhouse. Lynn Davis and all those guys are hooked into that place.
Yeah, I've heard.
Thats his, you know, and he loves to drink and shit, but he don't like
us stoners, Annie. He doesn't. Even if he's done it, that's his, what
makes, that's what puts his bread and butter on the table. God, you
look good in your shorts, come on out here and let me get you on the
video.
No!
Oh, come on please, can't I.
Inaudible

No!

Why?
No!

Laugh

Inaudible

just do drugs?

Ok,

(inaudible)

in there

(inaudible)

What?
If I get to your place before eight it should be between 7 and 8.
Ok, you have my number so you can call right?
Yeah, because I'd like to come down and buy that back but if not then yoi
cool. Thanks dear.
Your welcome.
Come on out here and look around.
Inaudible
Background noise (lawn mower) for approximately 44 seconds
Let me show you this garden I got goin' (inaudible) I got to get up
early, Annie, I'm not (inaudible) but I used (inaudible)
Inaudible
'• i » f i 'i •' i
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Inaudible

my stuff out.

Peas, Potatoes, look at those

tomatoes, Annie.
Those are nice.
You got to take some of the squash with ya.
Oh yeah

(inaudible)

There really good.
I love squash.
And they just go to waste if you don't give them away.
thirty fruit trees back here.

Yeah, I got about

Yeah, eye that.
Eye that

(inaudible)

Ok.
You know what I'm sayin'? Don't let anybody push you on, I'm
your boyfriend, (inaudible)

(inaudible)

No, he doesn't like it. Doesn't do pot at all, he doesn't like pot,
but cokes ok but not pot.
Inaudible

-

want that recording.

The what?
Remember when I called and left a message on your recorder?
Oh yeah.
Get that off there for me would ya?
Ok.
Good girl, Annie.
I'll take this one.
Take a bunch of those.
Inaudible
Yeah, (inaudible) maybe (inaudible) do some good. (inaudible)
put a bunch in there, Annie. We got more coming tonight.
Inaudible
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Police, on the floor, on the floor, on the floor.
palms up, palms up.

Let me see your hands<

Background noise for approximately 11 seconds
KO:

Get back

(inaudible)

up.

Background noise/inaudible conversation for approximately 38 seconds
Tape ends
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